Research 2026-02-24 Complex Management Bern

Troubled projects: when does persistence become a trap?

Troubled projects: when does persistence become a trap? — SHR, Bern
Troubled projects: when does persistence become a trap? — SHR, Bern

In a complex organisation, stopping a project affects budgets, interdependencies and the credibility of those responsible. For SHR's “Management complexe” programme, the managerial question is specific: how can leaders reassess a disappointing project without confusing persistence with justification of the past?

What the literature establishes

Barry M. Staw (1976, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance) experimentally studied reinvestment decisions following an unfavourable outcome. In this setting, people responsible for the initial decision committed more additional resources than those who were not responsible for it. The finding highlights a governance risk: asking a project's sponsor alone to assess whether it should continue does not constitute a neutral evaluation.

The weight of resources already committed

Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer (1985, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes) show that previous investments of money, effort or time can increase the tendency to continue an activity. Their research notably highlights the desire not to appear to have wasted those resources. This mechanism also concerns everyday decisions: the past becomes an argument when the decision should focus on the future consequences of the available options.

Troubled projects: when does persistence become a trap? — SHR, Bern — Berne
Troubled projects: when does persistence become a trap? — SHR, Bern — Berne

The premature conclusion

One might conclude that a disappointing project should be stopped or routinely assigned to a new manager. These studies justify neither general rule: past investment may have generated skills, assets or information that genuinely alter future prospects. The useful distinction is between irrecoverable expenditure, which cannot on its own justify continuation, and expected benefits and future costs, including the costs of exiting. (our executive and employee training programmes)

What the evidence cannot settle

These studies provide no universal stopping threshold for public-sector or industrial projects. Their experimental designs do not reproduce the full timespan, service obligations or technical dependencies of a complex organisation. Conversely, a project review may appear rigorous while remaining uninformative if participants document only reasons to continue, without considering a reduction in scope or termination.

A practical check in Berne

In Berne, an exercise within SHR's “Management complexe” programme could focus on a project review in the federal administration, public health, telecommunications or precision engineering, making sector-specific constraints explicit. Before the decision, ask the project manager and a colleague uninvolved in the initial decision to document independently the options of continuing, reducing scope and stopping, including their future costs, expected benefits and unavoidable obligations. Over a pilot period defined in advance, measure the proportion of continuation decisions whose supporting documentation includes this comparison and an observable condition for reassessment. This indicator checks decision-making discipline, not project profitability or the elimination of bias. To go further: explore the Complex Management training in Bern, or browse our executive and employee training programmes in Switzerland.

In pictures: Complex Management in Bern

Complex Management training in Bern — in practice
Complex Management training in Bern — in practice
Complex Management training in Bern — hands-on workshop
Complex Management training in Bern — hands-on workshop
Complex Management training in Bern — on the ground
Complex Management training in Bern — on the ground